A year larer, Analysis and Perspective of US Engagement in Afghanistan: Time for a Change
Dr. Assem Akram - November 26, 2002
A year after the US intervened in Afghanistan, it is but fair to briefly review and analyze where operation Enduring Freedom stands and to wonder if the Bush Administration has been successful in achieving its goals in Afghanistan. We will also reflect on the issue of leadership and question if the war-scared central-Asian State is on the right path to normalcy and stabilization?
Early Miscalculations
It seems that when it comes to the Afghan-American relationship, the United States suffers from myopia. A quick glance at the past relations of the two countries remind us that Washington has always belittled the importance of Afghanistan in the regional or international game and very sadly history has each time proven it wrong.
If we were to evoke only the last twenty-five years, the United States, while taking the right decision to support the Afghan Resistance, gave the bulk of all assistance to the most extremist groups among them such as the Hezb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The US Administration had in mind that extreme fundamentalist Islam would be a powerful arm to derail the Soviet empire. So, directly or indirectly through its Saudi and Pakistani proxies, it funded and helped these groups to the detriment of more nationalistic and moderate ones.
In the mid-eighties, Usama Ben Laden himself was commissioned by the CIA and the Saudi intelligence to move to Peshawar and serve as a financial liaison to funnel Arab petrodollars to Afghan Mujahedeen groups. Arab nationals and militants from other Islamic countries were readily issued Pakistani visas and were hosted and welcomed in Pakistan by the same Afghan groups which had been favored by US and Saudi dollars and who then, just years later, because of the Gulf War and as the Afghan Jihad was loosing its epic breath, channeled all their anger towards those who had fed them!
It is almost worthless to mention here how the US intelligence miscalculated its support to the nascent Taliban movement in 1994-1995 and how the Clinton Administration and the Saudis refused the offer made by the Khartoum Government to take delivery of Ben Laden and instead decided to send him to Afghanistan in 1996. Those are now known facts for which, very unfortunately, there hadn’t been word of any independent commission appointed to inquire and determine responsibilities.
Turning Point
Quickly in the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil, the Bush Administration, backed by a commotional public opinion, engaged itself in an operation which, international opinion and a certain sense of responsibilities weighing on the shoulders of the remaining super power oblige, was finally so designed as not to appear as a mere act of vengeance. Enduring Freedom was finally born and a multi-faceted operation was launched.
From the on start of the operation in October 2001, Afghan military and non-combatant political groups opposing the retrograde Taliban regime understood very well all the benefit they could draw from Washington’s new mood. Many of those groups, with some reason, were blaming the US to have backed the Taliban at its creation and were pointing out that an active conjunction of interests between regional allies of the US (Saudi Arabia/Pakistan) and oil interests (Unocal) were proof that the US was not really bothered by this regime and, from afar, was somehow giving Mollah Omar’s Islamic Emirate its silent blessing.
The US action aimed at 1) destroying Al-Qaeda terrorist infrastructures in Afghanistan and eventually capturing some of its members; 2) bringing down the Taliban regime; 3) setting-up a US-friendly Government; 4) addressing the humanitarian situation; 5) finally implicating the UN and key allies to give to the whole affair an international flavor and legitimacy.
By its title, Enduring Freedom was clearly emphasizing its Afghan aspect and was intended to bring back Afghanistan to stability and normalcy (“drying the swamp”) for both the benefit of the Afghans and the international community, so that the heartland Central-Asian country can no longer be a terrorist harbor.
After 9/11, the turn of the tide was indeed welcome for opposition groups such as the Northern Alliance (NA), whose controlled area had shrunk to a small triangle of land to the extreme North-East, by the Tajik border, and which was heavily relying on the help provided chiefly by Russia, Iran and India. Despite several trips and missions from senior Northern Alliance representatives to Washington, Administration officials would not commit themselves to engage the US on their side. Though, since the reprisal bombing of 1998 against alleged Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and the following embargo and diplomatic pressure put on the Taliban regime to deliver Usama Ben Laden and his associates, the American stance had grown visibly more hostile towards the Afghan fundamentalists.
Afghan opposition groups, especially the NA, sought smartly to take advantage of the Taliban’s harsh behavior towards the feminine gender to rally the backing of Western countries’ public opinions and governments and, key among them, the US ones. By some accounts, the US started supplying covert aid to the Northern Alliance as early as 1998. Parallel to that, Washington helped push the exiled King’s Rome-based initiative aiming at finding an inter-Afghan understanding and a peaceful settlement to the issue through the involvement of all concerned parties in a traditional elective process called Loya Jerga (Grand Assemble).
Before the 9/11 impulsed shift, Zaher-Shah’s initiative had been rejected by the Taliban hard-liners, leaving few hopes for a peaceful change. The military opposition had been decapitated just two days earlier by a kamikaze terrorist operation carefully organized for months by Al-Qaeda operatives from Europe posing as Arab reporters.
Once the decision was made in Washington that a war should be waged not on Afghanistan or the Afghan people but rather on the Taliban regime and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network based in Afghanistan, American money and sophisticated weaponry associated with on the ground collaboration of all opposition groups and the moral support of most political non-combatant organizations and personalities such as the former monarch, added to the lack of real popular base for the theocratic movement, the demise of the white flag bearer regime was quick, even quicker than many had hoped for.
Interim Administration by Forceps
With money to bribe, heavy bombings to persuade and the Northern Alliance to serve as proxy scouting for the US-led campaign, Mollah Omar and his illusive theocratic emirate liquefied and Usama Ben Laden and his Al-Qaeda network were hunted down with more or less success by the US military. Between October and December 2001, the US worked on finding key figures who could serve their purpose and rally a significant number of Afghans, targeting specially the southern Pashtun tier, thought to have been more favorable to the Taliban. While being in a strategic alliance with the Northern Alliance, Washington was eager to find somebody belonging to the Pashtun ethnic group to top a coalition interim government so as to silence critics who were blaming the United States to lay the ground for the creation of a government led by ethnically minoritarian non-Pashtuns (i.e. the Northern Alliance). Earlier efforts to develop southern insurgency by sending CIA-tied former Mujahedeen commander Abdul-Haq ended up in a quick fiasco: Abdul-Haq was rapidly caught by the Taliban, probably tipped off by Pakistani intelligence sympathizers, and hanged despite a spectacular last minute rescue attempt by the US military.
The US strategy with regards to setting up a post-Taliban government was two-fold. It aimed at giving the Afghans - and the international community – the impression the Afghans were masters of their own destiny and simultaneously to make sure that their own choice as to who should lead that entity would prevail. The Bonn Conference (Nov.27th-Dec.5th 2001) was designed exactly to suit that purpose.
The Bonn conference
The conference gathered under the same roof four Afghan groups with different military or political weights. But, after all, since the purpose was to form an all-Afghan coalition interim body, each group’s real weight mattered only in the distribution of key positions and the traditional haggling attached to it. The two major players were, on the one side, the Northern Alliance, US proxy in the battlefield, and the former king’s informal group which, though without an army, had high hopes based on the sympathetic fervor shown by Afghans worldwide and the International community alike in the preceding weeks. Two other groups were given a more marginal share: the so-called “Cyprus Process” and the “Peshawar Process” were sitting on side benches during the discussions.
The conference held in the former German federal capital was symbolically pluralist and by no means all-inclusive. Many former Mujaheddin group leaders, such as former president Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, as well as other political groups or figures in exile were denied participation, which prompted them to decry the exclusion. Some even thought that representatives of the Taliban movement itself should have been invited to participate as a matter of principle. Seemingly, decisions were made by the UN Secretary General’s special representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi. In fact, no decision was taken without the heavy-handed behind the scene diplomacy of the US. Bonn was shaped as to show the world that Afghans were deciding of their future without foreign interference. Indeed, one’s view on that meeting can vary a good matter depending on one’s expectations!
Stress on Ethnic Issues
Besides not being sufficiently representative of the Afghan exiled community as well as of those of the interior, the conference hosted by Germany on the instigation of the US and under the UN auspices had some other noticeable flaws. A major one worth to be mentioned was that negotiations to distribute portfolios was stressing on the ethnic background of the contestants, extrapolating on imaginary population numbers, whereas there hadn’t been any census conducted in Afghanistan for almost three decades!
Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country and it would be absurd to try to abstract it. But, it is also a fact that the “ethnic” debate had been a poisonous one for Afghanistan. Soviet invaders and regional “friends” such as Iran and Pakistan all have played the ethnic card to create and control client groups. But even in the worst of times and dissension between Resistance groups during twenty years of war, with the exception of the Shiite groups whose claims can be understood for historic reasons, none of them was claiming to base its request for power-sharing - or domination - on ethnicity. It is furthermore worth mentioning that none of the previous Afghan constitutions have had any reference or any substance of the kind.
Bonn was indeed a “premiere” in that matter and has set a dangerous precedent, putting at risk the country’s harmony to be restored. If decision was made to use ethnicity as the basis for power sharing, then why exclude all other ethnic minorities of Afghanistan: Turkmans, Qirghiz, Baluchs, Sikhs, etc, all should have had their fair share in that government!
US Ultimate Decision-Maker
The behind the scene, but not very discreet, role played by Zalmay Khalilzad, Afghan born White House NSC adviser, underlined Washington’s heavy implication. Afghan delegates were left with some latitude for negotiation, but when it came to the leadership issue, Washington’s decision was already made: Hamed Karzai, with long time ties with the US intelligence community and sent in mission inside the country with Special Forces operatives to succeed where Abdul-Haq had failed, was the pick. Incidentally, it should be noted that in order to give him a stature he had not, the most listened to radio in the area – BBC’s Persian program – was interviewing almost every night Mr Karzai hung to his satellite phone provided by the US, giving him the opportunity to tell tales of his attempt to “unite” the Pashtuns against the Taliban. In line with that PR policy, Karzai was given the privilege to open the Bonn moot with a live transmission from inside Afghanistan1, whereas at that time he was still a second category politician by Afghan standards.
Karzai, a long time friend of Zalmay Khalilzad and former colleague of his when both were advising the UNOCAL on how to build a pipeline in the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, was picked over some other potential contestants. It had been said that Zaher-Shah, the former king, had favored Abdul-Sattar Seerat, a professor of theology and former Justice Minister during the monarchy. But Sattar Seerat was firmly rejected by the US envoy who reportedly told him that he could not ascend to the position because he was not a Pashtun. Whereas Abdul-Satar Seerat had 1 Karzai spent in fact most of his time in hiding from the Taliban and had to retreat first in some remote areas of Uruzgan province mainly inhabited by Hazaras. Another time he was rescued by the US military that air lifted him to Quetta (Pakistan) before re-injecting him with more cash and special ops operatives.
all the necessary qualifications to take over such a position and not the least of them was that he was seen as a bridge between the former monarch’s group and the Northern Alliance with which he had long-standing cordial relations2. Other names had also circulated in the days previous to the conference and during the sittings but apart from one or two that currently serve as cabinet ministers or advisers in the Karzai administration, it would seem that none of them had the kind of trustworthiness and promise of allegiance to the US that Hamed Karzai had.
No Alternative Allowed
Was Washington’s choice a wise one? It is easily understandable that the Bush Administration would have done what ever was necessary to impose its man in a situation of uncertain warfare where what mattered in the end was not Afghanistan or the Afghans but the United States of America itself threatened and badly shaken by shadow warfare. The December 2001 choice could have been acceptable for Afghanistan - by stretching to the extreme selflessness! – if, and only if, it were to be temporary. But as unfortunately it was somehow expected, the temporary mission became more of an “enduring” one through a much advertised but chaotic and unsubstantiated Loya Jerga in June 2002.
Beside Abdul-Sattar Seerat, one of the personalities whose name was whispered with some insistence among many Afghans, was Samad Hamed, a former Afghan vice-Prime Minister, a well-respected and outspoken “cacique” living in exile in Germany and who, incidentally, happened to be a Pashtun. Mr Samad Hamed, or somebody matching his profile, would have been a much wiser choice for everyone: Afghans, Americans and the international community alike. Indeed, a personality with established reputation, with no obvious links to any foreign poweror, even worse, to any intelligence agency, would have commanded thorough respect among his fellow Afghans as well as in the outside world[1].
The ascension to power of a more “neutral” personality would have mostly resulted of his own merits, thus making his tenure potentially less “compromised”, allowing him to harbor that little touch of self-confidence that allows a statesman to move forward and make tough decisions.
Was Karzai the Wise Choice?
It would appear that Mr Karzai lacks most of the prerequisites to be an efficient leader capable to do the job he was picked for in a country like Afghanistan and in this particular situation. But, before further insisting on the negative aspects, let us give some credit to Hamed Karzai for his will to promote the reconstruction of his country and for trying to be as modernist as possible. Some would contend for his defense that he has few or no influence on the events. But then one would reply why is he sitting there pretending to be a leader? Furthermore, if he is in that position it is for a purpose and of his own desire for power, otherwise he should resign.
To succeed, Hamed Karzai would need to be an able strategist, an astute and determined politician willing to overcome at least some of the major hurdles his administration is facing, and not just trying to keep himself politically afloat. Making grandiloquent declarations like the one targeting “warlords” and requiring them to disarm, promising almost everything to everyone is a dangerous game, especially when words are not followed by action or facts.
Whereas Afghans were expecting some steady changes and the international community was tabling on the return of security and some kind of stability to seriously engage into the reconstruction effort, as pledged at the Tokyo summit, not much has yet happened. The only relatively safe place is the city of Kabul thanks to the peace-keeping/policing action of the ISAF. For the rest, as in Khost or Mazar-e-Sharif, real security is not there and international help doesn’t arrive the way it should. The country is divided into fiefdoms in its four corners and the central administration appears to be plagued by a high degree of bribery and nepotistic habits, reaching levels seen in Pakistan.
The Karzai interim administration not only lacks leadership and has a serious image problem at the very top, but it has also serious shortcomings and problems throughout all layers of its administrative apparatus. Let us not even mention the lower level personnel unpaid and untrained, which is the natural result of the country’s war-ravaged underdeveloped status. It is of course difficult to put all the blame on Mr Karzai alone, since this is a coalition government and he does not always have a choice as to who he “appoints”.
Appearances Matter
The way American operatives ostensibly take care of Hamed Karzai’s protection has negative consequences on the way he is perceived. And, sincerely, nothing is done to help defuse even a bit the idea of him being not much more than an “American stooge”.
Karzai was under US military protection from the very beginning of the campaign when he was dispatched on mission in Southwestern Afghanistan. When he finally reached Taliban-free Kandahar, he was escorted by his Special Ops praetorian guard, who assumed his security even while he was staying at the Governor House (whereas Kandahar is supposedly MrKarzai’s backyard!). After his selection in Bonn, he was airborne in the most obvious way by the same US military from Kandahar to Kabul to take charge of his new assignment. And, today, it is with similarly utterly visible US guards in charge of his protection that he moves around.
All that is not only shocking to most Afghans but it would be as much disturbing to anybody with a sense of national pride, no matter his/her country, no matter whether it is war time or peace time! Undeniably, it gives a very negative image of Hamed Karzai and is very detrimental to the US presence in Afghanistan itself.
To illustrate a little more that image issue and the apparent negligence on part of the Americans, somebody recounted the story of Hamed Karzai visiting an Afghan dignitary belonging to an old religious family in the surroundings of Kabul.
Before Karzai gets there, elements of the Afghan Army and Police closed the area and secured it. Then Americans came and searched the dignitary’s house, using dogs to sniff everything from rooms to packages and personal items. The host protested and told Karzai that next time around he should not bother to visit him if this is the way it should be. Karzai himself, the US operatives in charge of his security and their Afghan advisers should have known that it is a serious faux-pas to search women’s quarter in an Afghan house and to have dogs sniff people or items because, for most Afghans, and even more so for a religious leader, a dog’s contact to one’s cloth makes them dirty and unsuitable for prayers.
Barely “Primus Inter Pares”
In the Afghan society where the notion of “primus inter pares” may be more applicable than anywhere else, warlords, tribal leaders and other local chieftains don’t feel they are inferior to anyone and do not feel compelled to bow to anyone, unless they fear him or they willfully respect him. Hamed Karzai, for a number of reasons, does not command that kind of respect in most parts of the country or sections of the population.
Certainly, to expand his power, it was planned that he would benefit of his position to be a channel through which passes money and international aid and, therefore, for that reason if for nothing else, he would be “accepted” nolens volens. But that is not exactly what is happening. The international donors community having doubts on the security as well as on the capability of the Karzai administration to efficiently manage the aid flow, is slow to comply with its pledge. NGO’s and even UN Agencies, understandably advancing practicality and efficiency, often times deal directly with local authorities, by passing thus Kabul so desperately in need of recognition.
If Mr. Hamed Karzai can’t be the bread bearer of a devastated Afghanistan to assert his authority, then can he impose his power by being the guardian of law and order? Well, let us say that the awe the Karzai Administration can inspire to resentful groups is, at best, a very limited one, mainly related to the American military presence! A national army, a gendarmerie or a police force capable to enforce the law and/or the will of the government are in their tender age. Certainly, the Karzai Government is strong enough to beat and kill unarmed students protesting deplorable living conditions, but they are unable to fight some few Arabs scattered around the country or to secure the main roadways from growing banditries or villagers from being robbed and raped. Let us not forget that most of the warlords challenging the central government’s authority are being paid by the US military for their “assistance” in the fight against “remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taleban”. In those circumstances, no wonder why a Dostum, an Atta Mohammad or a Gul-Agha Shirzai, to name only a few ones, don’t really feel compelled to follow the “orders” of Mr. Karzai and his interim administration.
So, if Mr. Hamed Karzai cannot be economically indispensable and he cannot impose the rule of law, then, perhaps, his own moral persona can make a difference and move mountains? Alas, there too, there seems to be some kind of deficit. Despite some following he may have in the Kandahar region where his family belongs, Hamed Karzai is not and had not even have a chance to sit his position as the head of his own tribe, the Popalzai tribe, after his father was assassinated. Those who have asserted and “crowned” him, with some precipitation, “leader of Afghanistan’s Pashtuns” are simply unaware of the realities on the ground. Some Pashtuns more aware of ethnic issues even accuse him of “betraying” them to accommodate his powerful Northern Alliance allies.
Zaher Shah Invoked, Then Skipped Once Again…
The former Afghan monarch has been a recurrent recourse in embattled Afghanistan in search of peace and unity for decades. Not without criticism and clairvoyance, a majority of Afghans seems to have rallied the idea that he could be instrumental in bringing back peace to his country; and all the more so when the situation is at a stalemate. But very unfortunately, every time the situation has moved one way or the other, the benevolent aging king was quickly forgotten. It happened at the beginning of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; it happened when the Soviet wanted to withdraw and it happened again when the Taliban launched their blitzkrieg to seize power in 1996; and, very unfortunately, political opportunism made it happen once more in 2001 and in 2002.
I don’t think any reasonable mind would expect the old Afghan ex-monarch to play an active role and do the job of a Prime Minister or a Chancellor, but rather that symbolic of a guardian of institutions and traditions. The former king’s role could have been very similar to either some of the existing constitutional monarchies (Holland, Denmark, Spain, Japan, etc.) or, if the restoration of monarchy is not an option at this time because of some sensitivities - real or calculated - amongst sections of the Northern Alliance, then he could have become a transitional republican president with very few prerogatives, as it exists in many countries with parliamentarian system. Whatever the choice, which can only be temporary and should be sanctioned by the Afghan people’s suffrage, it would have allowed a more stable and much more influent government. If such a frame was established, then the position of chief of Government could be offered to somebody like Hamed Karzai, so as to take into consideration the new “conjuncture” Enduring Freedom has brought in and to satisfy the powerful, rather self-imposing, American guest.
Time to Adjust Policy
Had the Bush Administration been wiser in its approach on the whole Afghanistan issue during the last year, it would have acted otherwise. Leaving aside the debate about some tragic as well as strategic errors committed during the military campaign, focusing on the political aspect and the long-term implications and viability of what is being undertaken in Afghanistan, there is room for some serious rethinking and repositioning. Otherwise, resounding failure for the US foreign policy of the 21st century and chaos and civil war for the people Afghanistan await us at the corner.
The US presence in Afghanistan should change in nature and in ambition. The overwhelming striking capability of the United States military was, in the specific conditions of the post 9/11, in many ways a necessity. A necessity for the US to tell the world that they have the capability to strike back quickly; a necessity for the Bush administration to reassure the US public opinion so that it doesn’t loose its faith in its Government, as it happened during the Teheran hostages crisis; and finally, it was necessary for the Afghans’ sake too, otherwise they would have had to live for an undetermined number of years more under a dictatorial retrograde theocratic regime which was progressively trading its inherited cultural values and Islamic philosophy for the simplistic and intolerant vision conveyed by Wahabite and Ikhwan-ul-Muslemeen (Muslim Brotherhood) elements such as Usama Ben Laden.
It would be a pity that the kind of synergy created after 9/11 among a large cross section of the international community as well as many Afghans dry out and ends-up in a huge political and strategic fiasco with catastrophic long term consequences not only for the Afghans, but for the US, for the United Nations and in the end for any international operation called for by an emergency situation in the future.
“Nation Building” Vs Reconstruction
One key to success is to first determine the level of implication and then a target accordingly. The notion of “Nation Building” is an ambiguous one and, in the end, it can be viewed as somehow contemptuous. It comes up to saying “You are no nation, we are going to create one out of you!”. When this type of notion is put forward as a policy, no matter how well intentioned its proponents may be, one should not be surprised that people belonging to old civilizations react with stupor.
Does “Nation Building” mean that a certain model of society is going to be imposed upon any country that has gone through times of war and uncertainty? I don’t believe it is the role of the US or the UN to use firepower and money as leverage and take advantage of a situation of dire need of a given population to contrive changes in fields that derive from the prerogatives of a sovereign state.
The United States action and help in the reconstruction of Afghanistan is most welcome as are welcome all type of assistance from the International community. Economic assistance, cultural exchange and diplomatic cooperation are normal areas of relations between sovereign countries. As far as the political system, institutions and laws that establish the frame of a state, it is to its people to decide according to its cultural, social and historic background.
“Nation Building” is really an ambiguous expression that doesn’t serve any other purpose than irritating those it is supposed to benefit. I would strongly recommend banishing it form the current US foreign policy doctrinal vocabulary to have it replaced with more PR-friendly expressions such as “reconstruction” for instance.
Changes Needed
The US commitment in Afghanistan is examined with scrutiny by the world because it is seen as a test. Afghans, Americans and their allies ought to come up with a smart strategy that takes into account the long run, not just the day-to-day perspective. An Afghanistan politically stable and economically viable again is in the interest of every one, locally, regionally, and internationally. But there will be no political stability and even less durable security achieved unless:
- ISAF’s mission is expanded to major provincial cities and main highways. ISAF’s peacekeeping mission needs to be broadened to allow it to participate in military actions alongside the Afghan army if needed.
- US military operation in Afghanistan ends in its present shape and converts to become part (a preponderant one, if it wishes to) of the ISAF.
- US military cuts all ties with regional warlords and stops paying local militias.
- UN, regional organizations and countries individually speed up the re-constitution of an Afghan army. The Afghan Defense Ministry should be able to get sufficient budgeting to bring on its payroll all regional militias. It should also pay attention to include in the process all former Afghan military personnel wishing to come back to active duty.
- The international community engaged in Afghanistan makes sure that the next Loya Jerga and/or elections are fair and abide by agreed upon principles and rules. Afghanistan needs a leader with the national interest in mind, capable to command respect beyond the four walls of an office tightly-guarded by US operatives.
- The former monarch Mohammed Zaher-Shah is allowed to play an active and constructive role as catalysis and catharsis for the entire society (rather than being given the honorific and inconsequential title of “Father of the Nation” to get rid of him).
- Independent personalities, intellectuals and technocrats are allowed to participate without constraint in the political, social and economic life of the country.
- The situation of returning refugees is dealt with the highest priority and with serious planning so as to avoid urban concentration and creation of “slumvilles”.
Without some significant changes in the approach towards the Afghan dossier, everyone involved is running into serious problems. Alarming trends are already visible: resurgence of extremist islamist groups with terrorist leaning; surge of drug production; return of anarchy with a weak or non-existent central government surrounded by self-ruled regional fiefdoms; etc. How different is this situation from the one that pre-existed the Taliban and laid ground for their sweeping break-in into the Afghan and world arena? Do we really want to take the risk to see if history is going to repeat itself?
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[1] During that meeting with Zalmay Khalilzad in Bonn, Abdul Sattar Seerat, while agreeing to withdraw under pressure, had reportedly told the US Envoy “Is it any Pashtun or a specific Pashtun that you have in mind?”, thus signaling that he was not fooled by Khalilzad’s argument.
A year after the US intervened in Afghanistan, it is but fair to briefly review and analyze where operation Enduring Freedom stands and to wonder if the Bush Administration has been successful in achieving its goals in Afghanistan. We will also reflect on the issue of leadership and question if the war-scared central-Asian State is on the right path to normalcy and stabilization?
Early Miscalculations
It seems that when it comes to the Afghan-American relationship, the United States suffers from myopia. A quick glance at the past relations of the two countries remind us that Washington has always belittled the importance of Afghanistan in the regional or international game and very sadly history has each time proven it wrong.
If we were to evoke only the last twenty-five years, the United States, while taking the right decision to support the Afghan Resistance, gave the bulk of all assistance to the most extremist groups among them such as the Hezb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The US Administration had in mind that extreme fundamentalist Islam would be a powerful arm to derail the Soviet empire. So, directly or indirectly through its Saudi and Pakistani proxies, it funded and helped these groups to the detriment of more nationalistic and moderate ones.
In the mid-eighties, Usama Ben Laden himself was commissioned by the CIA and the Saudi intelligence to move to Peshawar and serve as a financial liaison to funnel Arab petrodollars to Afghan Mujahedeen groups. Arab nationals and militants from other Islamic countries were readily issued Pakistani visas and were hosted and welcomed in Pakistan by the same Afghan groups which had been favored by US and Saudi dollars and who then, just years later, because of the Gulf War and as the Afghan Jihad was loosing its epic breath, channeled all their anger towards those who had fed them!
It is almost worthless to mention here how the US intelligence miscalculated its support to the nascent Taliban movement in 1994-1995 and how the Clinton Administration and the Saudis refused the offer made by the Khartoum Government to take delivery of Ben Laden and instead decided to send him to Afghanistan in 1996. Those are now known facts for which, very unfortunately, there hadn’t been word of any independent commission appointed to inquire and determine responsibilities.
Turning Point
Quickly in the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil, the Bush Administration, backed by a commotional public opinion, engaged itself in an operation which, international opinion and a certain sense of responsibilities weighing on the shoulders of the remaining super power oblige, was finally so designed as not to appear as a mere act of vengeance. Enduring Freedom was finally born and a multi-faceted operation was launched.
From the on start of the operation in October 2001, Afghan military and non-combatant political groups opposing the retrograde Taliban regime understood very well all the benefit they could draw from Washington’s new mood. Many of those groups, with some reason, were blaming the US to have backed the Taliban at its creation and were pointing out that an active conjunction of interests between regional allies of the US (Saudi Arabia/Pakistan) and oil interests (Unocal) were proof that the US was not really bothered by this regime and, from afar, was somehow giving Mollah Omar’s Islamic Emirate its silent blessing.
The US action aimed at 1) destroying Al-Qaeda terrorist infrastructures in Afghanistan and eventually capturing some of its members; 2) bringing down the Taliban regime; 3) setting-up a US-friendly Government; 4) addressing the humanitarian situation; 5) finally implicating the UN and key allies to give to the whole affair an international flavor and legitimacy.
By its title, Enduring Freedom was clearly emphasizing its Afghan aspect and was intended to bring back Afghanistan to stability and normalcy (“drying the swamp”) for both the benefit of the Afghans and the international community, so that the heartland Central-Asian country can no longer be a terrorist harbor.
After 9/11, the turn of the tide was indeed welcome for opposition groups such as the Northern Alliance (NA), whose controlled area had shrunk to a small triangle of land to the extreme North-East, by the Tajik border, and which was heavily relying on the help provided chiefly by Russia, Iran and India. Despite several trips and missions from senior Northern Alliance representatives to Washington, Administration officials would not commit themselves to engage the US on their side. Though, since the reprisal bombing of 1998 against alleged Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and the following embargo and diplomatic pressure put on the Taliban regime to deliver Usama Ben Laden and his associates, the American stance had grown visibly more hostile towards the Afghan fundamentalists.
Afghan opposition groups, especially the NA, sought smartly to take advantage of the Taliban’s harsh behavior towards the feminine gender to rally the backing of Western countries’ public opinions and governments and, key among them, the US ones. By some accounts, the US started supplying covert aid to the Northern Alliance as early as 1998. Parallel to that, Washington helped push the exiled King’s Rome-based initiative aiming at finding an inter-Afghan understanding and a peaceful settlement to the issue through the involvement of all concerned parties in a traditional elective process called Loya Jerga (Grand Assemble).
Before the 9/11 impulsed shift, Zaher-Shah’s initiative had been rejected by the Taliban hard-liners, leaving few hopes for a peaceful change. The military opposition had been decapitated just two days earlier by a kamikaze terrorist operation carefully organized for months by Al-Qaeda operatives from Europe posing as Arab reporters.
Once the decision was made in Washington that a war should be waged not on Afghanistan or the Afghan people but rather on the Taliban regime and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network based in Afghanistan, American money and sophisticated weaponry associated with on the ground collaboration of all opposition groups and the moral support of most political non-combatant organizations and personalities such as the former monarch, added to the lack of real popular base for the theocratic movement, the demise of the white flag bearer regime was quick, even quicker than many had hoped for.
Interim Administration by Forceps
With money to bribe, heavy bombings to persuade and the Northern Alliance to serve as proxy scouting for the US-led campaign, Mollah Omar and his illusive theocratic emirate liquefied and Usama Ben Laden and his Al-Qaeda network were hunted down with more or less success by the US military. Between October and December 2001, the US worked on finding key figures who could serve their purpose and rally a significant number of Afghans, targeting specially the southern Pashtun tier, thought to have been more favorable to the Taliban. While being in a strategic alliance with the Northern Alliance, Washington was eager to find somebody belonging to the Pashtun ethnic group to top a coalition interim government so as to silence critics who were blaming the United States to lay the ground for the creation of a government led by ethnically minoritarian non-Pashtuns (i.e. the Northern Alliance). Earlier efforts to develop southern insurgency by sending CIA-tied former Mujahedeen commander Abdul-Haq ended up in a quick fiasco: Abdul-Haq was rapidly caught by the Taliban, probably tipped off by Pakistani intelligence sympathizers, and hanged despite a spectacular last minute rescue attempt by the US military.
The US strategy with regards to setting up a post-Taliban government was two-fold. It aimed at giving the Afghans - and the international community – the impression the Afghans were masters of their own destiny and simultaneously to make sure that their own choice as to who should lead that entity would prevail. The Bonn Conference (Nov.27th-Dec.5th 2001) was designed exactly to suit that purpose.
The Bonn conference
The conference gathered under the same roof four Afghan groups with different military or political weights. But, after all, since the purpose was to form an all-Afghan coalition interim body, each group’s real weight mattered only in the distribution of key positions and the traditional haggling attached to it. The two major players were, on the one side, the Northern Alliance, US proxy in the battlefield, and the former king’s informal group which, though without an army, had high hopes based on the sympathetic fervor shown by Afghans worldwide and the International community alike in the preceding weeks. Two other groups were given a more marginal share: the so-called “Cyprus Process” and the “Peshawar Process” were sitting on side benches during the discussions.
The conference held in the former German federal capital was symbolically pluralist and by no means all-inclusive. Many former Mujaheddin group leaders, such as former president Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, as well as other political groups or figures in exile were denied participation, which prompted them to decry the exclusion. Some even thought that representatives of the Taliban movement itself should have been invited to participate as a matter of principle. Seemingly, decisions were made by the UN Secretary General’s special representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi. In fact, no decision was taken without the heavy-handed behind the scene diplomacy of the US. Bonn was shaped as to show the world that Afghans were deciding of their future without foreign interference. Indeed, one’s view on that meeting can vary a good matter depending on one’s expectations!
Stress on Ethnic Issues
Besides not being sufficiently representative of the Afghan exiled community as well as of those of the interior, the conference hosted by Germany on the instigation of the US and under the UN auspices had some other noticeable flaws. A major one worth to be mentioned was that negotiations to distribute portfolios was stressing on the ethnic background of the contestants, extrapolating on imaginary population numbers, whereas there hadn’t been any census conducted in Afghanistan for almost three decades!
Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country and it would be absurd to try to abstract it. But, it is also a fact that the “ethnic” debate had been a poisonous one for Afghanistan. Soviet invaders and regional “friends” such as Iran and Pakistan all have played the ethnic card to create and control client groups. But even in the worst of times and dissension between Resistance groups during twenty years of war, with the exception of the Shiite groups whose claims can be understood for historic reasons, none of them was claiming to base its request for power-sharing - or domination - on ethnicity. It is furthermore worth mentioning that none of the previous Afghan constitutions have had any reference or any substance of the kind.
Bonn was indeed a “premiere” in that matter and has set a dangerous precedent, putting at risk the country’s harmony to be restored. If decision was made to use ethnicity as the basis for power sharing, then why exclude all other ethnic minorities of Afghanistan: Turkmans, Qirghiz, Baluchs, Sikhs, etc, all should have had their fair share in that government!
US Ultimate Decision-Maker
The behind the scene, but not very discreet, role played by Zalmay Khalilzad, Afghan born White House NSC adviser, underlined Washington’s heavy implication. Afghan delegates were left with some latitude for negotiation, but when it came to the leadership issue, Washington’s decision was already made: Hamed Karzai, with long time ties with the US intelligence community and sent in mission inside the country with Special Forces operatives to succeed where Abdul-Haq had failed, was the pick. Incidentally, it should be noted that in order to give him a stature he had not, the most listened to radio in the area – BBC’s Persian program – was interviewing almost every night Mr Karzai hung to his satellite phone provided by the US, giving him the opportunity to tell tales of his attempt to “unite” the Pashtuns against the Taliban. In line with that PR policy, Karzai was given the privilege to open the Bonn moot with a live transmission from inside Afghanistan1, whereas at that time he was still a second category politician by Afghan standards.
Karzai, a long time friend of Zalmay Khalilzad and former colleague of his when both were advising the UNOCAL on how to build a pipeline in the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, was picked over some other potential contestants. It had been said that Zaher-Shah, the former king, had favored Abdul-Sattar Seerat, a professor of theology and former Justice Minister during the monarchy. But Sattar Seerat was firmly rejected by the US envoy who reportedly told him that he could not ascend to the position because he was not a Pashtun. Whereas Abdul-Satar Seerat had 1 Karzai spent in fact most of his time in hiding from the Taliban and had to retreat first in some remote areas of Uruzgan province mainly inhabited by Hazaras. Another time he was rescued by the US military that air lifted him to Quetta (Pakistan) before re-injecting him with more cash and special ops operatives.
all the necessary qualifications to take over such a position and not the least of them was that he was seen as a bridge between the former monarch’s group and the Northern Alliance with which he had long-standing cordial relations2. Other names had also circulated in the days previous to the conference and during the sittings but apart from one or two that currently serve as cabinet ministers or advisers in the Karzai administration, it would seem that none of them had the kind of trustworthiness and promise of allegiance to the US that Hamed Karzai had.
No Alternative Allowed
Was Washington’s choice a wise one? It is easily understandable that the Bush Administration would have done what ever was necessary to impose its man in a situation of uncertain warfare where what mattered in the end was not Afghanistan or the Afghans but the United States of America itself threatened and badly shaken by shadow warfare. The December 2001 choice could have been acceptable for Afghanistan - by stretching to the extreme selflessness! – if, and only if, it were to be temporary. But as unfortunately it was somehow expected, the temporary mission became more of an “enduring” one through a much advertised but chaotic and unsubstantiated Loya Jerga in June 2002.
Beside Abdul-Sattar Seerat, one of the personalities whose name was whispered with some insistence among many Afghans, was Samad Hamed, a former Afghan vice-Prime Minister, a well-respected and outspoken “cacique” living in exile in Germany and who, incidentally, happened to be a Pashtun. Mr Samad Hamed, or somebody matching his profile, would have been a much wiser choice for everyone: Afghans, Americans and the international community alike. Indeed, a personality with established reputation, with no obvious links to any foreign poweror, even worse, to any intelligence agency, would have commanded thorough respect among his fellow Afghans as well as in the outside world[1].
The ascension to power of a more “neutral” personality would have mostly resulted of his own merits, thus making his tenure potentially less “compromised”, allowing him to harbor that little touch of self-confidence that allows a statesman to move forward and make tough decisions.
Was Karzai the Wise Choice?
It would appear that Mr Karzai lacks most of the prerequisites to be an efficient leader capable to do the job he was picked for in a country like Afghanistan and in this particular situation. But, before further insisting on the negative aspects, let us give some credit to Hamed Karzai for his will to promote the reconstruction of his country and for trying to be as modernist as possible. Some would contend for his defense that he has few or no influence on the events. But then one would reply why is he sitting there pretending to be a leader? Furthermore, if he is in that position it is for a purpose and of his own desire for power, otherwise he should resign.
To succeed, Hamed Karzai would need to be an able strategist, an astute and determined politician willing to overcome at least some of the major hurdles his administration is facing, and not just trying to keep himself politically afloat. Making grandiloquent declarations like the one targeting “warlords” and requiring them to disarm, promising almost everything to everyone is a dangerous game, especially when words are not followed by action or facts.
Whereas Afghans were expecting some steady changes and the international community was tabling on the return of security and some kind of stability to seriously engage into the reconstruction effort, as pledged at the Tokyo summit, not much has yet happened. The only relatively safe place is the city of Kabul thanks to the peace-keeping/policing action of the ISAF. For the rest, as in Khost or Mazar-e-Sharif, real security is not there and international help doesn’t arrive the way it should. The country is divided into fiefdoms in its four corners and the central administration appears to be plagued by a high degree of bribery and nepotistic habits, reaching levels seen in Pakistan.
The Karzai interim administration not only lacks leadership and has a serious image problem at the very top, but it has also serious shortcomings and problems throughout all layers of its administrative apparatus. Let us not even mention the lower level personnel unpaid and untrained, which is the natural result of the country’s war-ravaged underdeveloped status. It is of course difficult to put all the blame on Mr Karzai alone, since this is a coalition government and he does not always have a choice as to who he “appoints”.
Appearances Matter
The way American operatives ostensibly take care of Hamed Karzai’s protection has negative consequences on the way he is perceived. And, sincerely, nothing is done to help defuse even a bit the idea of him being not much more than an “American stooge”.
Karzai was under US military protection from the very beginning of the campaign when he was dispatched on mission in Southwestern Afghanistan. When he finally reached Taliban-free Kandahar, he was escorted by his Special Ops praetorian guard, who assumed his security even while he was staying at the Governor House (whereas Kandahar is supposedly MrKarzai’s backyard!). After his selection in Bonn, he was airborne in the most obvious way by the same US military from Kandahar to Kabul to take charge of his new assignment. And, today, it is with similarly utterly visible US guards in charge of his protection that he moves around.
All that is not only shocking to most Afghans but it would be as much disturbing to anybody with a sense of national pride, no matter his/her country, no matter whether it is war time or peace time! Undeniably, it gives a very negative image of Hamed Karzai and is very detrimental to the US presence in Afghanistan itself.
To illustrate a little more that image issue and the apparent negligence on part of the Americans, somebody recounted the story of Hamed Karzai visiting an Afghan dignitary belonging to an old religious family in the surroundings of Kabul.
Before Karzai gets there, elements of the Afghan Army and Police closed the area and secured it. Then Americans came and searched the dignitary’s house, using dogs to sniff everything from rooms to packages and personal items. The host protested and told Karzai that next time around he should not bother to visit him if this is the way it should be. Karzai himself, the US operatives in charge of his security and their Afghan advisers should have known that it is a serious faux-pas to search women’s quarter in an Afghan house and to have dogs sniff people or items because, for most Afghans, and even more so for a religious leader, a dog’s contact to one’s cloth makes them dirty and unsuitable for prayers.
Barely “Primus Inter Pares”
In the Afghan society where the notion of “primus inter pares” may be more applicable than anywhere else, warlords, tribal leaders and other local chieftains don’t feel they are inferior to anyone and do not feel compelled to bow to anyone, unless they fear him or they willfully respect him. Hamed Karzai, for a number of reasons, does not command that kind of respect in most parts of the country or sections of the population.
Certainly, to expand his power, it was planned that he would benefit of his position to be a channel through which passes money and international aid and, therefore, for that reason if for nothing else, he would be “accepted” nolens volens. But that is not exactly what is happening. The international donors community having doubts on the security as well as on the capability of the Karzai administration to efficiently manage the aid flow, is slow to comply with its pledge. NGO’s and even UN Agencies, understandably advancing practicality and efficiency, often times deal directly with local authorities, by passing thus Kabul so desperately in need of recognition.
If Mr. Hamed Karzai can’t be the bread bearer of a devastated Afghanistan to assert his authority, then can he impose his power by being the guardian of law and order? Well, let us say that the awe the Karzai Administration can inspire to resentful groups is, at best, a very limited one, mainly related to the American military presence! A national army, a gendarmerie or a police force capable to enforce the law and/or the will of the government are in their tender age. Certainly, the Karzai Government is strong enough to beat and kill unarmed students protesting deplorable living conditions, but they are unable to fight some few Arabs scattered around the country or to secure the main roadways from growing banditries or villagers from being robbed and raped. Let us not forget that most of the warlords challenging the central government’s authority are being paid by the US military for their “assistance” in the fight against “remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taleban”. In those circumstances, no wonder why a Dostum, an Atta Mohammad or a Gul-Agha Shirzai, to name only a few ones, don’t really feel compelled to follow the “orders” of Mr. Karzai and his interim administration.
So, if Mr. Hamed Karzai cannot be economically indispensable and he cannot impose the rule of law, then, perhaps, his own moral persona can make a difference and move mountains? Alas, there too, there seems to be some kind of deficit. Despite some following he may have in the Kandahar region where his family belongs, Hamed Karzai is not and had not even have a chance to sit his position as the head of his own tribe, the Popalzai tribe, after his father was assassinated. Those who have asserted and “crowned” him, with some precipitation, “leader of Afghanistan’s Pashtuns” are simply unaware of the realities on the ground. Some Pashtuns more aware of ethnic issues even accuse him of “betraying” them to accommodate his powerful Northern Alliance allies.
Zaher Shah Invoked, Then Skipped Once Again…
The former Afghan monarch has been a recurrent recourse in embattled Afghanistan in search of peace and unity for decades. Not without criticism and clairvoyance, a majority of Afghans seems to have rallied the idea that he could be instrumental in bringing back peace to his country; and all the more so when the situation is at a stalemate. But very unfortunately, every time the situation has moved one way or the other, the benevolent aging king was quickly forgotten. It happened at the beginning of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; it happened when the Soviet wanted to withdraw and it happened again when the Taliban launched their blitzkrieg to seize power in 1996; and, very unfortunately, political opportunism made it happen once more in 2001 and in 2002.
I don’t think any reasonable mind would expect the old Afghan ex-monarch to play an active role and do the job of a Prime Minister or a Chancellor, but rather that symbolic of a guardian of institutions and traditions. The former king’s role could have been very similar to either some of the existing constitutional monarchies (Holland, Denmark, Spain, Japan, etc.) or, if the restoration of monarchy is not an option at this time because of some sensitivities - real or calculated - amongst sections of the Northern Alliance, then he could have become a transitional republican president with very few prerogatives, as it exists in many countries with parliamentarian system. Whatever the choice, which can only be temporary and should be sanctioned by the Afghan people’s suffrage, it would have allowed a more stable and much more influent government. If such a frame was established, then the position of chief of Government could be offered to somebody like Hamed Karzai, so as to take into consideration the new “conjuncture” Enduring Freedom has brought in and to satisfy the powerful, rather self-imposing, American guest.
Time to Adjust Policy
Had the Bush Administration been wiser in its approach on the whole Afghanistan issue during the last year, it would have acted otherwise. Leaving aside the debate about some tragic as well as strategic errors committed during the military campaign, focusing on the political aspect and the long-term implications and viability of what is being undertaken in Afghanistan, there is room for some serious rethinking and repositioning. Otherwise, resounding failure for the US foreign policy of the 21st century and chaos and civil war for the people Afghanistan await us at the corner.
The US presence in Afghanistan should change in nature and in ambition. The overwhelming striking capability of the United States military was, in the specific conditions of the post 9/11, in many ways a necessity. A necessity for the US to tell the world that they have the capability to strike back quickly; a necessity for the Bush administration to reassure the US public opinion so that it doesn’t loose its faith in its Government, as it happened during the Teheran hostages crisis; and finally, it was necessary for the Afghans’ sake too, otherwise they would have had to live for an undetermined number of years more under a dictatorial retrograde theocratic regime which was progressively trading its inherited cultural values and Islamic philosophy for the simplistic and intolerant vision conveyed by Wahabite and Ikhwan-ul-Muslemeen (Muslim Brotherhood) elements such as Usama Ben Laden.
It would be a pity that the kind of synergy created after 9/11 among a large cross section of the international community as well as many Afghans dry out and ends-up in a huge political and strategic fiasco with catastrophic long term consequences not only for the Afghans, but for the US, for the United Nations and in the end for any international operation called for by an emergency situation in the future.
“Nation Building” Vs Reconstruction
One key to success is to first determine the level of implication and then a target accordingly. The notion of “Nation Building” is an ambiguous one and, in the end, it can be viewed as somehow contemptuous. It comes up to saying “You are no nation, we are going to create one out of you!”. When this type of notion is put forward as a policy, no matter how well intentioned its proponents may be, one should not be surprised that people belonging to old civilizations react with stupor.
Does “Nation Building” mean that a certain model of society is going to be imposed upon any country that has gone through times of war and uncertainty? I don’t believe it is the role of the US or the UN to use firepower and money as leverage and take advantage of a situation of dire need of a given population to contrive changes in fields that derive from the prerogatives of a sovereign state.
The United States action and help in the reconstruction of Afghanistan is most welcome as are welcome all type of assistance from the International community. Economic assistance, cultural exchange and diplomatic cooperation are normal areas of relations between sovereign countries. As far as the political system, institutions and laws that establish the frame of a state, it is to its people to decide according to its cultural, social and historic background.
“Nation Building” is really an ambiguous expression that doesn’t serve any other purpose than irritating those it is supposed to benefit. I would strongly recommend banishing it form the current US foreign policy doctrinal vocabulary to have it replaced with more PR-friendly expressions such as “reconstruction” for instance.
Changes Needed
The US commitment in Afghanistan is examined with scrutiny by the world because it is seen as a test. Afghans, Americans and their allies ought to come up with a smart strategy that takes into account the long run, not just the day-to-day perspective. An Afghanistan politically stable and economically viable again is in the interest of every one, locally, regionally, and internationally. But there will be no political stability and even less durable security achieved unless:
- ISAF’s mission is expanded to major provincial cities and main highways. ISAF’s peacekeeping mission needs to be broadened to allow it to participate in military actions alongside the Afghan army if needed.
- US military operation in Afghanistan ends in its present shape and converts to become part (a preponderant one, if it wishes to) of the ISAF.
- US military cuts all ties with regional warlords and stops paying local militias.
- UN, regional organizations and countries individually speed up the re-constitution of an Afghan army. The Afghan Defense Ministry should be able to get sufficient budgeting to bring on its payroll all regional militias. It should also pay attention to include in the process all former Afghan military personnel wishing to come back to active duty.
- The international community engaged in Afghanistan makes sure that the next Loya Jerga and/or elections are fair and abide by agreed upon principles and rules. Afghanistan needs a leader with the national interest in mind, capable to command respect beyond the four walls of an office tightly-guarded by US operatives.
- The former monarch Mohammed Zaher-Shah is allowed to play an active and constructive role as catalysis and catharsis for the entire society (rather than being given the honorific and inconsequential title of “Father of the Nation” to get rid of him).
- Independent personalities, intellectuals and technocrats are allowed to participate without constraint in the political, social and economic life of the country.
- The situation of returning refugees is dealt with the highest priority and with serious planning so as to avoid urban concentration and creation of “slumvilles”.
Without some significant changes in the approach towards the Afghan dossier, everyone involved is running into serious problems. Alarming trends are already visible: resurgence of extremist islamist groups with terrorist leaning; surge of drug production; return of anarchy with a weak or non-existent central government surrounded by self-ruled regional fiefdoms; etc. How different is this situation from the one that pre-existed the Taliban and laid ground for their sweeping break-in into the Afghan and world arena? Do we really want to take the risk to see if history is going to repeat itself?
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[1] During that meeting with Zalmay Khalilzad in Bonn, Abdul Sattar Seerat, while agreeing to withdraw under pressure, had reportedly told the US Envoy “Is it any Pashtun or a specific Pashtun that you have in mind?”, thus signaling that he was not fooled by Khalilzad’s argument.